ADCU Asked Who Is Responsible for London’s Robotaxis. The Answer Is the Driver in the Seat.

Investigation · Driverless Cars

When Uber and Wayve’s self-driving cars began carrying passengers in London in September, the App Drivers and Couriers Union asked a simple question: who are the people sitting behind the wheel, and who is responsible when something goes wrong? London Drivers Voice put ADCU’s questions to TfL, Wayve and Uber. TfL and Wayve answered on the record. Their answers point to one conclusion: in London’s first passenger-carrying robotaxi trial, a licensed private hire driver carries full responsibility for a car that, most of the time, an AI system is driving.

The questions ADCU asked

On 3 September, ADCU raised concerns about the safety drivers in the Uber/Wayve vehicles: whether they were licensed private hire drivers, what checks they had passed, how they had been recruited, and where liability would sit if something went wrong. ADCU advised Londoners not to use the service. LDV sent the same questions to TfL, Wayve and Uber on 23 September.

What TfL said

TfL replied within two days. “All the safety drivers are London licensed Private Hire Vehicle (PHV) drivers, so they have passed the same checks as other London licensed PHV drivers,” a TfL spokesperson said. The trips, TfL said, are ordinary PHV trips, “conducted in licensed PHVs with a licensed PHV driver under Uber’s existing PHV Operator licence”. On liability, TfL said it “will depend on the exact circumstances of an incident” but that “in general the same principles as any PHV trip would apply.”

Asked whether TfL regards the licensed driver as the driver while the automated system is in control, TfL was unequivocal: “These vehicles are not licensed as automated vehicles, they are licensed as PHVs and therefore a licensed PHV driver has to be present and remains responsible for the vehicle at all times.”

What Wayve said, and the Otto Car connection

Wayve’s answers added a detail not previously reported. The safety drivers are “licensed PHV drivers, recruited and managed via Uber’s partner Otto Car,” a Wayve spokesperson said. Otto Car is one of London’s largest PCO car rental fleets, and LDV has reported before on its role in the city’s private hire market. It is now also supplying the people who supervise Uber’s robotaxis.

Wayve confirmed the drivers hold the same checks as any other PHV driver. It also cleared up a discrepancy LDV had raised. Wayve has advertised “Vehicle Safety Operator” jobs that did not appear to require a TfL licence. Those, Wayve said, are its own internal staff who supervise its test fleet. They “do not work within Wayve and Uber’s PHV service.”

On responsibility, Wayve’s position matches TfL’s: “The licensed PHV driver is responsible at all times. They supervise Wayve’s autonomy and may proactively intervene in certain scenarios in a busy city like London.” On liability, Wayve said it “currently follows the usual motor-insurance rules and TfL’s private hire licensing framework,” and that the new rules for fully driverless vehicles “will apply only once Wayve-Uber receives the necessary approvals for a driverless service.”

One incident, two accounts

The question of who is really in control came into focus after a ride taken by a BBC journalist. According to reports of that ride, on a narrow side road a parked van’s rear doors appeared to swing open, the car braked sharply, an alarm sounded inside the car, and the safety driver took control. Wayve said at the time that the intervention was the driver’s own decision and that it was confident its system would have handled the situation.

Wayve now disputes that account. It told LDV that “that characterization of what happened is actually incorrect,” and that footage from the vehicle “showed that the van across the way already had the doors open well before the Wayve vehicle pulled out, so they didn’t ‘swing’ open suddenly as the guest at the time thought they experienced.”

LDV has not seen the footage and cannot say which account is correct. Reports of the ride say the car itself braked sharply and sounded an alarm before the driver stepped in, which Wayve’s statement does not address. Either way, the episode shows the tension at the centre of this trial: the system may judge one thing, the human in the seat another, and only the human is legally responsible for the outcome.

One roadside check

LDV asked TfL whether its compliance officers had carried out any roadside checks on these vehicles or their drivers since they began carrying passengers. TfL said it believed one stop had been carried out, with a compliant outcome, and that such stops are carried out “in the same manner as any other PHV stops.” TfL did not set out how that works in practice when the automated system is in control of the car.

ADCU: “That is precisely the problem”

LDV shared TfL’s and Wayve’s answers with ADCU. The union said they address its concerns “only in the narrowest procedural sense,” and that they “simply restate the regulatory status quo.”

“The responses so far confirm only one thing: the licensed PHV driver is being held responsible for the safe operation of a vehicle that is, in practice, being driven by an AI system,” ADCU said. “That is precisely the problem.”

ADCU said a licensed driver “cannot meaningfully be ‘responsible at all times’ for a vehicle whose driving decisions are being made by an autonomous system,” and that there is no clarity on the drivers’ training, oversight or protections, and no transparency about disengagements, near misses or incidents. It described the arrangement as “a textbook example of algorithmic exploitation: shifting risk onto workers while companies reap the benefits of automation.” ADCU continues to advise Londoners not to use the service “until there is full transparency, independent oversight, and clear accountability.” Its full response is published below.

Who has not answered

Uber, which runs the service under its PHV operator licence, did not respond to LDV’s questions by the time of publication. Otto Car, which Wayve says recruits and manages the drivers, did not respond to LDV’s questions about how many drivers it supplies, their employment status, how they are paid, what training they receive for supervising an autonomous vehicle, and whether they also carry out ordinary Uber trips. Any response from either will be added to this article.

What it means for drivers

The answers settle the regulatory facts. The safety drivers are licensed, checked PHV drivers. The trips are ordinary PHV trips. The driver in the seat is responsible, and liability follows the ordinary rules.

What they leave open is everything that matters to the people doing the work. What training does a PHV driver receive before supervising an AI system on London’s streets? How are they paid for a shift in which they are responsible for every second but drive only some of them? What happens to their licence, their insurance and their record if the system makes a mistake they did not catch in time? And will TfL, Wayve or Uber publish how often the drivers have had to take control?

Those questions will matter more, not less, as the trial grows. Any expansion beyond the current 15 vehicles depends on TfL extending its trial approval of the Wayve modification, as LDV reported last week. When it is asked to, the experience of the drivers in these seats should be part of the evidence.

The responses in full

TfL, 25 September 2026

“All the safety drivers are London licensed Private Hire Vehicle (PHV) drivers, so they have passed the same checks as other London licensed PHV drivers. The trips taken are PHV trips, conducted in licensed PHVs with a licensed PHV driver under Uber’s existing PHV Operator licence. While liability will depend on the exact circumstances of an incident, in general the same principles as any PHV trip would apply.”

TfL, 1 October 2026 (follow-up questions)

LDV: Could you confirm what was actually granted, and whether any separate cap or condition applies?
“TfL granted PHV vehicle licences to the modified vehicles. PHV licences are granted for a period of one year. The nuance that I think you are alluding to is that – rather than a bespoke licence or cap on PHV licences – TfL has limited the approval of the vehicle modification itself, having approved it on a trial basis. TfL will continue to closely monitor the use of these vehicles and take immediate action if passenger safety is compromised in any way.”

LDV: When the automated system is driving and the licensed PHV driver is supervising, does TfL regard that licensed driver as the driver for the purposes of PHV licensing obligations and conduct standards?
“These vehicles are not licensed as automated vehicles, they are licensed as PHVs and therefore a licensed PHV driver has to be present and remains responsible for the vehicle at all times.”

LDV: Have TfL compliance officers carried out any roadside checks on these vehicles or their drivers? If so, how many, and were any issues found? And how would an on-street stop be carried out while the automated system is driving?
“I believe that there has been one stop carried out, with a compliant outcome. These stops are carried out in the same manner as any other PHV stops.”

Wayve, 25 September 2026

LDV: Who are these safety drivers and how were they recruited?
“They are licensed PHV drivers, recruited and managed via Uber’s partner Otto Car.”

LDV: Are they licensed TfL private hire drivers, holding the same medical, safeguarding and regulatory checks as any other PHV driver?
“Yes”

LDV: If not, what specific qualifications and authority do they hold, and how does that relate to the “Vehicle Safety Operator” job listings Wayve has published, which do not appear to require a TfL PHV licence?
“Vehicle Safety Operators are Wayve’s internal operators who supervise our test fleet. They do not work within Wayve and Uber’s PHV service.”

LDV: On the reported incident: does Wayve’s statement that its system could have handled the situation reflect a view that the safety driver’s intervention was unnecessary, and if so, how does that square with the driver being described as “fully responsible” for the vehicle at all times?
“The licensed PHV driver is responsible at all times. They supervise Wayve’s autonomy and may proactively intervene in certain scenarios in a busy city like London. Regarding this specific event, we also want to clarify that that characterization of what happened is actually incorrect. The footage from the vehicle showed that the van across the way already had the doors open well before the Wayve vehicle pulled out, so they didn’t “swing” open suddenly as the guest at the time thought they experienced.”

LDV: Where does liability currently sit, with Wayve, Uber, or TfL’s licensing framework, given no UK operator has yet completed the regulatory steps toward the Automated Vehicles Act’s special liability regime?
“Liability currently follows the usual motor-insurance rules and TfL’s private hire licensing framework. The new rules for fully driverless vehicles will apply only once Wayve-Uber receives the necessary approvals for a driverless service.”

ADCU, 30 September 2026

“The App Drivers’ and Couriers’ Union welcomes the clarification provided by TfL and Wayve, but these answers do not address the core concerns we have raised about the safety drivers in the autonomous vehicles now carrying passengers in London: Who is responsible? What training have they received? What protections do they have? And what happens when something goes wrong?

The responses so far confirm only one thing: the licensed PHV driver is being held responsible for the safe operation of a vehicle that is, in practice, being driven by an AI system. That is precisely the problem.

1. Do these answers address ADCU’s concerns?
Only in the narrowest procedural sense. TfL and Wayve have confirmed that the safety drivers are licensed PHV drivers recruited via Otto Car, and that liability currently follows the usual PHV rules. But this simply restates the regulatory status quo. It does not answer the substantive safety and labour-rights issues raised by ADCU. Our concerns remain:

  • A licensed PHV driver cannot meaningfully be “responsible at all times” for a vehicle whose driving decisions are being made by an autonomous system.
  • There is no clarity on the training, oversight, or protections provided to these drivers, despite the fact they are being placed in a high-risk testing environment.
  • There is no transparency about disengagements, near misses, or incidents, nor any assurance that drivers will not be blamed for failures of the AI system.
  • There is no explanation of how algorithmic decision-making interacts with PHV licensing obligations, including fitness to drive, duty of care, and insurance liability.

2. Does ADCU still advise Londoners not to use the service?
Yes. Until there is full transparency, independent oversight, and clear accountability for autonomous vehicle operations, ADCU continues to advise Londoners not to use this service. Our position is based on three principles:

  1. Passenger safety must not be compromised by experimental technology.
  2. Drivers must not be scapegoated for the failures of autonomous systems.
  3. Public trials must not be used to normalise the erosion of workers’ rights through automation.

3. What does “the licensed driver is responsible at all times” mean for the drivers doing this work?
Wayve’s statement confirms our concerns around drivers carrying full legal responsibility, while the AI carries out the driving. This raises serious issues:

a. Safety and liability
Drivers are being placed in a position where:

  • They must monitor an autonomous system they did not design, cannot control, and cannot predict.
  • They may be held liable for system failures they cannot reasonably prevent.
  • They face potential insurance, licensing, and legal consequences for errors made by the AI.

This is not a safe or fair working environment. Rather, it is a textbook example of algorithmic exploitation: shifting risk onto workers while companies reap the benefits of automation.

b. Algorithmic management concerns
ADCU has repeatedly warned that Uber’s use of opaque algorithmic systems already harms drivers through:

  • Unpredictable pay
  • Unfair work allocation
  • Intrusive surveillance
  • Automated decision-making without accountability

Introducing autonomous vehicles into this environment magnifies these risks, especially when drivers are held responsible for decisions made by an AI system.”

LDV put ADCU’s questions to TfL, Wayve and Uber on 23 September 2026, with follow-up questions to TfL on 25 September and to Otto Car on 25 September. Uber and Otto Car had not responded by the time of publication. The account of the BBC journalist’s ride draws on published reports of that ride.

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